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In 2008, the United Kingdom followed the arguments brought forward by proponents of the exemption system and abolished the tax credit system for the foreign source dividends of its domestic multinational fi rms. 10 In the United States, the tax credit system is still in force but, in 2004, a tax holiday was granted for the repatriation of foreign profi ts of US multinational fi rms. In contrast, during the 2008 presidential camForty-eight years ago, Peggy Brewer Musgrave (née Richman 1 ) founded the modern theory of international taxation. There are few theories in public fi nance which have been as infl uential with regard to real world tax policy. Musgrave , provided an intellectual foundation for international taxation agreements such as the OECD convention on double taxation treaties. 6 According to Musgrave's theory, each country has an incentive to tax the foreign profi ts of its multinational fi rms even if these profi ts have already been taxed abroad. Since double taxation is ineffi cient from a global point of view, countries should agree to adopt a system of international taxation in which foreign tax payments are credited against domestic taxes. Accordingly, the OECD Tax Treaties let countries choose between the tax credit system and exempting foreign income from tax. In other words, countries choose between equal treatment for domestic and foreign profi ts and the benefi cial tax treatment of foreign income (i.e. the exemption system).
In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that, due to changes in the economic environment, the existing rules for taxing foreign profi ts might be in need of reform. However, the direction of reform is controversial. Some authors, including Desai and Hines 7 , challenge Musgrave's tax policy recommendations. Based on new theoretical arguments and empirical fi ndings, it is argued that the tax credit Johannes Becker* and Clemens Fuest**
The Taxation of Foreign Profi ts -the Old View, the New View and a Pragmatic View
The increasing importance of multinational fi rms raises the question as to whether and how governments should tax repatriated profi ts, i.e. affi liate profi ts returned to the headquarters. The answer to this question is especially relevant for profi t repatriations within the European Union where multinational fi rm investment is substantial and tax competition is supposed to be of rising intensity. This paper reviews the criticism of the standard view (the "old view") of foreign profit taxation, which goes back to Peggy Musgrave. The "new view" of international taxation is based on recent empirical studies and favours a system in which foreign profi ts are exempt from tax. The debate between old view and new view proponents is critically discussed and, fi nally, the two are confronted with a "pragmatic view" on foreign profit taxation which crucially incorporates compliance and tax administration costs. Corporate Taxation with actual fi rm investment behaviour if the effective tax rates are equal, which can be achieved by a tax credit system.
For the purpose of clarity, consider the following simple model. Let k and k* denote the stocks of capital at home and abroad respectively, and f(k) and f*(k*) the output of production. Capital is rented at an interest rate of r from domestic savers who provide fi xed savings of K . . Then, after-tax profi ts π are given by
where τ and τ* denote source-based corporate taxes at home and abroad respectively, and τ r the repatriation tax levied by the home country. Profi t maximisation implies that the multinational fi rm sets f' = r and f*' = r
The interest rate adjusts until k + k* = K . .
Is such investment behaviour effi cient? Musgrave argued that the multinational fi rm does not account for the fact that taxes paid at home are part of national income, rather than costs. The same is true for interest paid to domestic savers. Seen from the national point of view, income is given by W N = π + rK + τf(k) + τ r f*(k*). Musgrave then asks which kind of repatriation tax maximises national income:
Accounting for the multinational's investment behaviour, national optimality is reached if f' = f*'(1 -τ*). Choosing an adequate tax rate aligns the fi rm's incentives with national ones. The fi rm then invests so as to maximise national welfare:
1 -τ Thus, if foreign profi ts are fully taxed after deducting foreign tax payments, the fi rm's investment implicitly satisfi es national optimality.
Of course nationally optimal tax policy does not take into account that foreign taxes are income, too. Therefore, national optimality does not equal global optimality. Seen from the global point of view, income is given by W G = π + rK + τf(k) + (τ* + τ r )f*(k*). The optimal repatriation tax problem then reads paign, even the deferral of domestic taxes on foreign profi ts was criticised as a subsidy for "sending US jobs offshore".
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In Germany, where foreign source dividends are (mostly) exempt from domestic taxation, some economists propose the introduction of the tax credit system, as exemption is thought to lead to ineffi ciently high investment levels abroad.
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In the following, we discuss and compare the old Musgrave view on foreign income taxation and the new view favouring exemption. Afterwards we confront these two arguments with a third, more pragmatic view which -interestingly -is mainly brought forward by scholars from the business administration branch and tax practitioners.
The Old View
Considering Musgrave's theory, it is helpful to recall that, at this time in the 1960s, the United States was the world's largest capital exporter. Musgrave assumed that a representative multinational fi rm invests a fi xed capital stock either in domestic projects or abroad. The fi rm maximises its profi ts and, consequently, invests so as to equalise the after-tax returns in both locations. However, such investment behaviour is not in the national interest, as taxes paid to the domestic government are, from a social point of view, income and not cost. Thus, nationally optimal investment equalises the pretax return at home with the after-tax return abroad. As Musgrave demonstrated, such investment behaviour requires a system with full domestic taxation of foreign income after deducting foreign tax payments. If global welfare is the policy goal, the picture changes again. Globally optimal investment equalises the pre-tax returns in both locations. This is in line Corporate taxes may act as a backstop to the personal income tax, which requires the tax credit system. However, as fi rm ownership is increasingly internationally diversifi ed, this rationale for taxing foreign source income is losing plausibility. Moreover, the corporate income tax can be seen as a tax on domestic economic activity, which is justifi ed as fi rms benefi t from public services. This approach suggests that corporate income earned abroad should not be taxed domestically, so that the exemption system seems appropriate. 10 To be precise, the exemption system has been introduced for income repatriated from foreign subsidiaries (in contrast to foreign permanent establishments). 
Corporate Taxation
given from the national point of view and there is a (virtually) infi nite supply of capital at this rate. In such a setting, an increase in foreign investment leaves the interest rate and, thus, domestic investment unaffected. A tax on repatriated profi ts no longer increases domestic investment; it just reduces foreign investment by domestic fi rms. If national income maximisation is the policy goal, a tax on foreign profi ts effectively reduces income and should therefore be abandoned. In other words, tax exemption is the best policy option from a national point of view.
In the context of the model described above, the multinational has the same profi t function as in (1). Again, the fi rm sets f' = r and f*' = r
However, its investment does not lead to any (or only negligible) interest rate adjustments. The optimisation problem from the national point of view is now given by
where the multinational's capital stock, k + k*, may well be smaller or larger than the domestic supply of savings K . . Nationally optimal investment abroad implies f*' = r 1 -τ* and, thus, the optimality of exempting foreign profi ts from tax, τ r = 0. The reason is that a tax-induced reduction of foreign investment does not lead to an increase in domestic investment (as in the old view model); rather, the tax implies that the investor abandons some projects. As a consequence, the whole national economy foregoes some income.
With regard to global optimality, exemption proponents do not deny that the tax credit system maximises global income. Of course, if policy changes are evaluated on a global scale (and not from the viewpoint of a small country), there is no such thing as a given interest rate. In terms of the model described above, the issue of global optimality simply cannot be investigated in this setup because the model is not closed: the supply of capital to the world capital market is not modelled explicitly.
There are, however, some drawbacks to the claim that tax exemption of for eign profi ts is nationally optimal. In the old
which implies optimal investment according to f' = f*'. Again, it is feasible to align the fi rm's interests with global optimality objectives by choosing the adequate repatriation tax rate:
1 -τ
Since its publication, Musgrave's theory has been extended and criticised many times. Important extensions concern the assumption of endogenous savings 13 , the implementation of double taxation agreements in a strategic multicountry setting 14 , taking into account shareholder and fi rm level taxation 15 and the focus on mergers and acquisitions
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. Various attempts at criticism before the new view did not meet with success.
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The New View
In Musgrave's model, the supply of capital available for investment in the domestic and foreign locations is limited. As a consequence, more foreign investment crowds out domestic investment. The new view starts from the observation that this model feature is at odds with the capital markets of today. Since capital controls have been removed in most countries, it seems adequate to assume a large world capital market instead of a limited capital supply by domestic savers. With a large world market for capital, the interest rate is no longer determined by domestic supply and the multinational's demand. Instead, the interest rate is taken as shows that, across all fi rms, foreign investment crowds out domestic investment "dollar for dollar". 24 This fi nding is confi rmed by proponents of exemption. 25 Moreover, exemption is no adequate option for a world which tries to coordinate on effi ciency-enhancing tax systems. Exemption proponents stress the national interest but do not deny that the tax credit system might be more suitable in promoting global effi ciency. Thus, one may translate the new view into something like the following approach: given that we cannot coordinate with all countries implementing the tax credit system, tax policy should focus on national optimality and abolish the tax credit system.
The new view argument based on the assumption of a perfectly elastic capital supply is perhaps the most important one in favour of tax exemption, but the debate does not stop there. In tax credit countries like the USA and -until 2008 -the UK, a number of somewhat different arguments were brought forward which can be summarised as follows. Firstly, a tax on foreign profi ts creates incentives to move headquarters to other countries. There have been some widely discussed examples in the UK, and headquarter mobility in the form of corporate inversions, in which US parent companies of foreign subsidiaries transformed into subsidiaries of foreign fi rms, is an important policy issue in the USA.
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Empirical studies like Voget 27 which try to systematically capture the extent of headquarter mobility show that it is observable but only to a limited extent.
Secondly, a tax on repatriated profi ts increases the cost of capital and therefore deteriorates the competitiveness of domestic fi rms. As many countries already employ the ex- view model, both domestic and foreign investment reach effi cient levels if the adequate tax system is applied. In the new view model, nationally optimal investment at home would imply f' = r, but fi rms only invest until f' = r 1 -τ Therefore, one might argue that, given the government's spending needs, it may be worthwhile to slightly cut domestic corporate tax rates and increase the tax on foreign investment. Indeed, as Devereux 18 shows, the optimal tax rates on domestic and foreign capital depend on the elasticity of capital demand in both locations. Furthermore, introducing diseconomies of scale which effectively limit the size of the multinational fi rm implies that the old Musgrave result is restored. Finally, the fact that the marginal investment unit needs to remain untaxed (at least from the national point of view) does not require exemption of all foreign profi ts. A cross-border cash-fl ow system 19 may generate tax revenue without distorting foreign investment decisions (the same may apply for domestic investment, of course, which raises the question why cash-fl ow taxes are not used more in real world tax systems).
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Old View versus New View -What's the Score?
Clearly there are limitations to both the old and the new view. However, countries have to decide which system of international taxation to adopt and, thus, which view to favour. One might argue that the debate boils down to a single empirically testable question: what happens to domestic investment if foreign investment is increased? The old view's answer is that domestic investment decreases, therefore foreign investment should be taxed. The new view's answer is that nothing happens, therefore foreign investment should not be taxed.
The question of whether domestic and foreign investment are substitutes, not linked at all or even complements has been the focus of many recent empirical studies. 21 Using data from large effi ciency costs under the tax credit system. As many empirical studies have shown, deferral 34 and tax avoidance activities 35 play an important role. It is, however, less clear whether tax avoidance incentives are stronger under the tax credit system or under the exemption system. Whereas the incentive to defer profi t repatriations is higher under the tax credit system, the effective tax differentials and, thus, the incentive to shift profi ts across locations, are higher under the exemption system. It is an open question which of these two margins implies the larger effi ciency cost.
In total, the old view seems to be more robust than initially expected by the new view advocates. So it might be surprising that international tax policy seems to be decidedly inclined towards the new view. As mentioned in the introduction, the United Kingdom recently abandoned the tax credit system and adopted an exemption system (accompanied, though, by a range of tax law provisions designated to avoid profi t shifting activities of multinational fi rms). Currently, the United States is the last large country holding on to the tax credit system. And, despite the concern about excessive investment abroad mentioned in the introduction, there are strong political forces favouring a switch to exemption.
Given the state of the debate, the question arises why there is such a strong movement towards exemption. It may be the case that there is another argument, a third view in favour of exemption that is persuasive enough to make people accept the potential investment distortions implied by the exemption system. We call this view the pragmatic view.
The Pragmatic View
The debate between the old view and the new view focuses on the effi ciency of capital allocation and is led mainly by economists. In recent years, some tax policy practitioners and tax lawyers have brought forward the simple but compelling argument that a tax credit system might just be too expensive to implement. Whereas a tax exemption system only builds on the difference between foreign and domestic profi ts, a tax credit system needs to allocate profi ts to each location within a multinational fi rm. The complexity of fi rm structures typical for modern multinationals makes it hard and expensive to trace income through all layers of the fi rm, for both the reporting fi rm and the auditing authority. Complex ownership arrangements add to these diffi culties. emption system, fi rms from tax credit countries have a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, countries should switch to the exemption system. This argument is very similar to the strategic trade arguments made in the 1980s 28 and is therefore subject to the same sort of criticism. The argument can, however, be restated in the framework discussed above: a tax on repatriated profi ts leads to a reduction in foreign activity without increasing domestic activity. Under imperfect competition, the situation gets even worse, as the oligopoly rents are reduced. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the exemption proponents implicitly assume that negative tax rates are ruled out. If they are allowed for, a case for subsidies for foreign activity can be made. Moreover, if transfer prices for intra-fi rm trade are taken into account, the case for exemption becomes less obvious. 29 A third important argument builds on the difference between greenfi eld investment and mergers and acquisitions (i.e. mere changes in ownership). Desai and Hines 30 argue that ownership changes do not affect the allocation of real capital in the fi rst place but may have real effi ciency effects. Repatriation taxes, however, distort the allocation of ownership across countries. 31 As we show in Becker and Fuest 32 , this consideration is correct but incomplete. An effi cient ownership allocation does not require zero taxation of all repatriated profi ts. A cross-border cash-fl ow tax system may generate tax revenues without distorting the decision to merge with or to acquire foreign fi rms. 33 Fourthly and fi nally, there is the argument that deferral of profi t repatriation and other avoidance techniques imply vere lack of thorough empirical studies which clarify the relative cost of compliance and tax administration of the tax credit system and the exemption system. From the old view perspective, the cost difference would have to be substantial in order to justify a switch to the exemption system.
Conclusions
For decades, the theory and practice of international taxation have been strongly infl uenced by what we have called the "old view" of foreign profi t taxation. According to this view, the application of the tax credit system is globally optimal, while nationally optimal tax policy would imply a double taxation of border-crossing capital income fl ows. Recently, however, this view has been challenged both in the academic debate and in real world tax policy, where the exemption system has gained support. In a world where capital markets are more and more integrated and multinational fi rms fi nd it easier to shift their headquarters across countries, the case for the tax credit system is called into question. The "new view" seems to suggest that exemption is at least nationally optimal. Nevertheless, while the new view has introduced new and relevant aspects into the debate, it is not clear whether these arguments are suffi cient to establish the superiority of exemption so convincingly that abolishing the domestic taxation of foreign source dividends is justifi ed. We therefore point to a third, more pragmatic approach to the taxation of foreign source income. While both the old and the new view focus on the implications of taxation for the international allocation of capital, the "pragmatic view" emphasises the compliance and administration costs of taxing foreign source income. According to this view, these costs are rising as multinational fi rms become larger and increasingly complex. Given that there are many ways of avoiding taxes on repatriated profi ts, this view suggests that the balance between the benefi ts of raising tax revenue from foreign investment and the costs, in particular the compliance and administration costs, has changed and made the taxation of foreign source income unattractive. Clearly, more empirical research on compliance and administration costs related to the taxation of border-crossing economic activity is needed to investigate whether this is true.
is supposed "to provide important benefi ts in terms of reduced compliance costs (particularly in relation to foreign dividends)". 36 Similarly, a policy paper issued by the International Chamber of Commerce, which compares the tax credit system and the exemption system, concludes: "On balance, ... the ICC favours an exemption system on foreign dividends primarily because ... the costs of compliance for foreign dividends are considerably reduced as compared to a tax credit system." 37 The compliance and administration costs of corporate taxation are signifi cant. The European Commission 38 estimates that large fi rms on average bear a compliance cost of more than €1.4 million or 1.9% of their total tax payments, which is in line with the results found by Slemrod and Blumenthal 39 for large US fi rms. For small fi rms, average compliance costs are estimated to equal €200,000 or 30.9% of their tax payments. 40 Most importantly for the purpose of this paper, the European Commission 41 fi nds that compliance costs increase by more than 400% when the fi rm is active in more than one jurisdiction. 42 There is less evidence for tax administration costs. Some studies suggest that administration costs are somewhat lower than compliance costs, 43 but estimates of differences in these costs between auditing a purely national fi rm and a multinational fi rm are not available. Also, no comparisons between compliance costs under tax credits and under exemption are available. 44 The pragmatic argument that the tax credit system is just too costly to implement is potentially a strong one. Its simplicity and bluntness have probably prevented public fi nance theorists from dealing with it more closely, but this does not reduce its relevance. There is, however, a se-
